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This study investigates changes in audit strategy in China following the intro-
duction of risk-based auditing standards rather than an internal control-based
audit mode. Speciﬁcally, we examine whether auditors are implementing the
risk-based audit mode to evaluate corporate governance before distributing
audit resources. The results show that under the internal control-based audit
mode, the relationship between audit eﬀort and corporate governance was
weak. However, implementation of the risk-based mode required by the new
auditing standards has signiﬁcantly enhanced the relationship between audit
eﬀort and corporate governance. Since the change in audit mode, the Big
Ten have demonstrated a signiﬁcantly better grasp of governance risk and allo-
cated their audit eﬀort accordingly, relative to smaller ﬁrms. The empirical evi-
dence indicates that auditors have adjusted their audit strategy to meet the
regulations, risk-based auditing is being achieved to a degree, reasonable
and eﬀective corporate governance helps to optimize audit resource allocation,
and smaller auditing ﬁrms in particular should urgently strengthen their
risk-based auditing capability. Overall, our ﬁndings imply that the mandatory
switch to risk-based auditing has optimized audit eﬀort in China.
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The information asymmetry between a principal (shareholder) and agent (management) may lead to
adverse selection and moral hazard. When an enterprise constitutes a series of linked contracts (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976), managers are motivated to manipulate accounting policies and accounting choices to meet
contract demands (Dechow et al., 2010). The question is how to eﬀectively alleviate and control such manage-
rial behavior. Theoretically, eﬀective and reasonable internal controls can suppress management’s manipula-
tion of ﬁnancial information to some extent because one of the functions of internal controls is to provide
reasonable assurance of the reliability of ﬁnancial reporting. Of course, auditing is also an external mechanism
designed to mitigate agency problems, and, when applied using the internal control-based audit mode, the
auditor must thoroughly understand the internal controls related to the ﬁnancial statements in question to
be able to identify material misstatements by the company.
Unfortunately, the frequent cases of ﬁnancial and management fraud and false accounting information
seen in recent years have raised awareness that internal controls are not eﬀective in preventing these practices
(Cao and Qian, 2011). Internal controls fail to reduce audit risk to an acceptable level because corporate gov-
ernance is the main factor in audit risk, with eﬀective controls depending on the rationality of corporate gov-
ernance mechanisms. Reﬂective and reasonable corporate governance mechanisms are eﬀective in mitigating
and controlling the manipulation of ﬁnancial information and adverse selection by management. Regular and
eﬀective mechanisms can also monitor, motivate and evaluate management, thereby reducing the probability
of managers failing to meet their contractual obligations (and thus manipulating ﬁnancial information) and
increasing the reliability of that information.
As a key principle, the ﬁnancial reporting and behavior of auditors is directly related to the reliability of
accounting information (Watts and Zimmerman, 1983). External auditing, as an important part of external
monitoring, provides reasonable assurance that ﬁnancial reporting is fair and lawful in all material respects
(Choi and Wong, 2007). Eﬀective corporate governance can provide reasonable assurance of the quality of
ﬁnancial information and reduce audit risk, thus inﬂuencing auditor resources and eﬀort. The revised auditing
standards introduced by the U.S. Sarbanes–Oxley Act require the implementation of risk-based auditing,
necessitating that auditors become thoroughly familiar with corporate governance mechanisms. The new audit
guidelines implemented in China from 1 January 2007 also require such familiarity of auditors to enable them
to assess the risk of material misstatements and conﬁgure their auditing eﬀorts accordingly.
Because the audit mode in China did not change as a spontaneous response of auditors to fraud risk, but
rather was mandated by the government, this study investigates whether auditors have actually changed to
the risk-based mode and now evaluate corporate governance before they conﬁgure their audit eﬀort. The results
show that under the old regulations, when auditors applied the internal control-based audit mode, the relation-
ship between audit eﬀort and corporate governance was weak. Since implementation of the new risk-based
mode required by the new auditing standards, that relationship has become signiﬁcantly stronger. Further anal-
ysis reveals that the Big Ten auditing ﬁrms have demonstrated a signiﬁcantly better grasp of governance risk,
and allocate their auditing resources accordingly, in the wake of the changes relative to their smaller counter-
parts. The empirical evidence suggests that the higher the degree of corporate governance in a ﬁrm, the greater
the assurance of its ﬁnancial statements, which can save audit eﬀort. Our ﬁndings also indicate that auditors
have adjusted their audit strategies to meet the new regulations, that risk-based auditing is being achieved to
a certain degree, that reasonable and eﬀective corporate governance helps to optimize audit resource allocation
and that smaller auditing ﬁrms, in particular, need to strengthen their risk-based auditing capability as a matter
of urgency. In sum, the risk-based audit mode has helped considerably to optimize auditing eﬀort in China.
The main contributions of this study are as follows. First, audit quality refers to the joint probability of an
auditor ﬁnding and reporting a client’s material misstatements. Appropriate audit eﬀort is not only important
to the auditor fulﬁlling the audit contract, but also to the allocation of infrastructure to identify material mis-
statements. Despite the requirement for auditors to report such misstatements, research in this area is rare in
China, and this study thus provides important empirical evidence.
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between corporate governance and audit eﬀort. It conﬁrms the positive role of the risk-oriented audit mode
in linking audit eﬀort to corporate governance mechanisms, thus enriching the literature on auditing stan-
dards, auditing theory and corporate governance, and serving as a reference for policymakers in setting
accounting policy.
Third, this study provides an empirical evidence to show that China’s auditors have adjusted their audit
strategies in accordance with the 2007 regulations. Despite much discussion of the risk-based audit mode,
empirical knowledge of its use is scarce. Hence, this study’s examination of its application in practice is of
great signiﬁcance in helping practitioners to understand the mode’s importance.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature review. Section 3 pro-
vides the study’s institutional background, theoretical analysis and hypotheses. The study design is set out in
Section 4 and the results of the empirical analysis in Section 5. Conclusions are drawn in Section 6.
2. Literature review
There is an important practical and academic value in identifying and conﬁguring the main risks aﬀecting
audit eﬀort to reduce audit risk and improve audit eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness. Simunic (1980) views audit risk
as a loss in present value to third parties due to audited ﬁnancial reports, and argues that investment in audit-
ing resources reduces that risk. Houston et al. (1999) expand Simunic’s (1980) deﬁnition of audit risk, viewing
it as comprising of two parts: undiscovered material misstatements and immaterial (irrelevant) misstatements.
They suggest that an auditor should ﬁrst assess the business risk and then determine his or her audit eﬀort in
accordance with it. Although Houston et al. (1999) propose that audit eﬀort be based on business risk, they
oﬀer no clear deﬁnition of what constitutes business risk. Empirical research carried out by O’Keefe et al.
(1994) to characterize business risk shows that audit eﬀort is signiﬁcantly aﬀected by ﬁrm size, complexity,
debt risk, internal control risk and ﬁrm listing status. With advances in practical and academic research, sub-
sequent studies have expanded the deﬁnition of business risk to include corporate governance. Bedard and
Johnstone (2004) studies corporate governance risk, earnings management and audit eﬀort pricing, and ﬁnds
that a company’s earnings management risk and governance risk increase with the rate of increase in an
auditor’s hourly wage. The evidence from the aforementioned overseas studies suggests that understanding
of the business risk arising from audit risk has shifted from a vague understanding of speciﬁc risks to an
understanding of internal control risk, and then expanded to encompass corporate governance risk.
Although researchers have investigated the corporate governance and auditing practices of China’s main
listed ﬁrms in the areas of audit quality, audit opinions, audit fees, information disclosure and internal gov-
ernance, none to date has examined audit modes or audit eﬀort in relation to corporate governance. This study
diﬀers from overseas research in the following ways. First, it uses data from companies listed in China.
Relatively few studies have examined audit eﬀort in developing countries, primarily because of limited data
availability. Those that have been carried out are generally based on small samples and use questionnaire data
from a single auditing ﬁrm or from clients audited by one of the Big Four. In contrast, the data used in this
study cover the entire A-share market, and are thus widely applicable. Second, the corporate governance index
used in this study is more comprehensive and objective than that used in Bedard and Johnstone (2004). As
China’s corporate governance mechanisms diﬀer from those of other countries, this study not only enriches
the global literature on audit eﬀort and risk-based auditing, but also provides evidence to support the regu-
lation of the auditing market. Third, its focus on China’s change to risk-based auditing and the link between
corporate governance and audit eﬀort, an area of interest since the work of Bedard and Johnstone (2004),
enriches audit theory and the theory of auditing standards.
3. System background, theoretical analysis and hypotheses
3.1. Institutional audit mode change
Traditional audit theory views independent auditing as necessary because of the separation between own-
ership and management rights. Its ultimate goal is to reduce the agency problem, capital market information
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achieve these objectives, auditors have to adopt a particular audit mode, or methodology, during the audit.
However, with economic development and changes in the auditing environment, the prevailing audit mode
has required a change.
Until the late 1930s, audit procedures were central to the formulation of U.S. auditing standards, the main
goal being troubleshooting using a variety of measures. This early auditing mode was characterized by detailed
accounts auditing without risk sampling, and audit eﬀort was applied according to the volume of business
accounts and business complexity. From the 1930s to the late-1970s, along with economic development, grow-
ing business sizes, the expansion of transactions and the increased complexity of internal management, com-
pany accounting became more complex, and the use of a variety of troubleshooting measures became
uneconomical. Because management was responsible for ﬁnancial reports, there was a close relationship
between internal control and the quality of ﬁnancial information. Changes also occurred in the audit mode
in this period, with the application of sampling techniques adopted and a greater need for practitioners to
understand business risk. The earlier detailed audit mode thus shifted to an internal control-based mode that
required the auditor to understand the internal controls relevant to a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial statements, and then esti-
mate the risk of material misstatements in accordance with the design of the ﬁrm’s internal controls, for exam-
ple, whether they were operational, and ﬁnally allocate resources and determine the nature and scope of the
audit based on that risk.
Despite the inﬂuence of laws and regulations on audit demand and supply, subsequent prominent cases of
management fraud litigation and audit failures led auditors to realize that assessing the relevance of ﬁnancial
statements and internal controls was insuﬃcient to eﬀectively prevent and reduce audit risk, as management
has an incentive to manipulate accounting policies and choose self-seeking options. However, the degree of
such manipulation depends on the corporate governance mechanisms in place. Reasonable and eﬀective cor-
porate governance arrangements serve to constrain and incentivize management eﬀectively, thereby reducing
the likelihood of the company’s ﬁnancial information being manipulated. It was in this context that the
risk-based audit mode emerged. Risk-based auditing requires the auditor to assess a company’s internal con-
trols and accounting books, estimate the likelihood of a material misstatement based on the company’s cor-
porate governance mechanisms, and then determine the audit scope, priorities and eﬀort required accordingly.
The risk-based audit mode, which is an improved version of the traditional internal control-based mode,
was an inevitable development (Wang and Wu, 2005) in helping to analyze and discover material misstate-
ments. The risk-based audit system in the United States developed gradually from the late-1970s to the
1990s. In 1983, the U.S. General Accounting Standards Board (GASB) issued its Statement on Auditing
Standards No. 47, covering audit risk and importance, followed by further audit guidelines. As the U.S.
risk-based mode matured, the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) began to
study and learn from the United States. In 2000, the IAASB and GASB established a joint risk analysis group,
which concluded that the new method could improve audit eﬀectiveness. The serious economic consequences
of the Enron scandal led the IAASB to accelerate the introduction of risk-based auditing. In October 2003, it
issued International Standard on Auditing ISA 315 entitled “Identifying and assessing the risks of material
misstatement through understanding the entity and its environment” and ISA 330, “The auditor’s responses
to assessed risks,” which emphasized the importance of auditor familiarity with the corporate governance of
clients.
3.2. Audit mode change in China
To align with international practice, in February 2006 China’s Ministry of Finance issued new audit prac-
tice guidelines that came into eﬀect on 1 January 2007. The new standards require auditors to implement the
risk-based audit mode and familiarize themselves with clients’ corporate governance mechanisms to be able to
identify and assess the risk of material misstatements in ﬁnancial statements before determining the appropri-
ate audit nature, timeframe and eﬀort.
Before 2007, China’s auditing standards were internal control-based and auditors assessed audit risk by
evaluating the internal controls on ﬁnancial reporting. Provided that auditors acted in accordance with the
standards of practice, were familiar with the internal controls related to ﬁnancial statements and collected
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sponding legal and regulatory responsibility even if audit failure or management fraud was subsequently
uncovered. However, in 2007, regulators implemented revised auditing standards to meet the requirements
of China’s economic development and secure convergence with international auditing practices.
The old and new auditing standards diﬀer signiﬁcantly. First, the new standards require reasonable assur-
ance from auditors that ﬁnancial statements are free of material misstatements on the whole, regardless of
whether such misstatements are the result of fraud or error (Auditing Standards No. 1141, 16). This require-
ment increases the auditor’s liability and risk. Second, because of the risk that corporate governance is the
source of audit risk, the new auditing standards require auditors to understand and evaluate a client’s corpo-
rate governance practices and environment, and thereby identifying and assessing the risk of material misstate-
ments as a basis for determining audit eﬀort, procedures and scope. Third, because the new auditing standards
increase auditor responsibility in cases of fraud, and because the degree and eﬀectiveness of corporate gover-
nance is a fundamental cause of concentrated business risk, auditors are required to use the risk-based audit
mode when auditing listed companies.
As China’s revised auditing standards were introduced as a mandatory change, not in response to audit
failure and fraud risk, and to adapt to the country’s market economy and allow convergence with interna-
tional auditing practices, the increased legal liability and risk for auditors have forced them to pay attention
to and evaluate corporate governance to reduce audit risk.
3.3. Theoretical analysis and hypotheses
A major objective of internal control is to ensure that ﬁnancial information is reliable and eﬀective. A range
of business control activities such as authorization requirements, separation of incompatible duties, systematic
accounting, property protection and budget controls helps to detect unintentional errors within a company
contract (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2008; Doyle et al., 2007), internal control deﬁciencies and poor-quality ﬁnan-
cial information (Doyle et al., 2007). Eﬀective internal controls can also improve the quality of earnings.
Auditing is a signiﬁcant external governance mechanism that helps to explicate the internal control of ﬁnancial
statements and establish the risk of material misstatements by enterprises.
However, as internal control mechanisms are aﬀected by corporate governance, the supervision and encour-
agement of corporate governance are important to ensure the eﬀective operation of those mechanisms.
According to agency theory, one of the purposes of corporate governance is to guarantee the eﬀective oper-
ation of ﬁnancial controls in the following ways. First, management directly supervises daily ﬁnancial controls
through its internal control activities and takes responsibility for the veracity and reliability of ﬁnancial infor-
mation. Second, corporate governance supervises management’s ﬁnancial control activities, as the board and
audit committee are required to monitor the reliability of its ﬁnancial reporting (Beasley et al., 1997;
Johnstone et al., 2001). The lack of an audit committee (Dechow et al., 1996; McMullen, 1996) and a small
proportion of independent directors and audit committee members on the board both increase the likelihood
of false ﬁnancial reports (Beasley, 1996; Abbott et al., 2000; Beasley et al., 2000). Studies have shown internal
controls to be weak and ineﬀective in monitoring management when the above corporate governance mea-
sures are absent or defective. Because eﬃcient corporate governance is able to control and reduce a company’s
agency problem, it has the ability to evaluate, inspire and motivate management, which can eﬀectively prevent
the manipulation of ﬁnancial information and fraud (Cai, 2007).
Compared with the internal control-based audit mode, the risk-based mode, if implemented eﬀectively, can
identify risks more scientiﬁcally, assess the risk of material misstatements more rationally, and thus determine
the key risk areas and appropriate audit eﬀort more accurately. To reduce the level of audit risk, auditors need
to increase their eﬀort in key areas and reduce their eﬀort in non-priority areas, rendering the overall audit
eﬀort allocation more rational, saving overall eﬀort and improving the eﬃciency of resource allocation.
However, the change in audit method in China occurred for reasons of socioeconomic development and
international convergence. The risk-based audit method did not arise as a spontaneous response to audit risk,
but rather through government decree. Due to the consequent change in liability and the requirement for audi-
tors to have a thorough understanding and assessment of corporate governance, auditors who fail to examine
a material misstatement that is related to governance bear legal responsibility for that misstatement.
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the new audit mode to evaluate corporate governance, leading to a change in audit eﬀort. The literature shows
that in 1994, after detailed standards were issued for non-standard audit opinions in response to a regulatory
requirement to reduce audit risk, auditors exhibited a signiﬁcant increase in non-standard audit opinions (e.g.,
DeFond et al., 2000).
Based on the above analysis and discussion, we hypothesize that before implementation of the new audit
practice guidelines in China, auditors complied with the old internal control-based auditing standards and
tended to lack motivation, or the necessary guidance, to evaluate corporate governance. Thus, the correlation
between corporate governance and audit resources was weak in that period.
After implementation of the new audit practice guidelines, auditors had to adjust their audit strategy to
meet regulatory requirements, and thus became concerned with the assessment of governance-related factors,
leading to a change in audit eﬀort. The change also led to more eﬀective corporate governance, which reduced
the risk of material misstatements and was more conducive to saving audit eﬀort. Accordingly, we propose the
following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1. Since the change to the risk-based audit mode in China, the negative correlation between
corporate governance and audit eﬀort has been signiﬁcantly enhanced.
Independent auditing is an important aspect of external oversight, and is carried out by allocating audit
eﬀort. According to DeAngelo (1981), audit quality refers to the joint probability of a material misstatement
in a client’s ﬁnancial statements being found and reported by the auditor and the auditor’s ability to detect
such a misstatement due to professional competence, including audit experience, audit mode (method) and
audit eﬀort.
Although the risk-based audit mode requires auditors to gain competence in identifying the risk of material
misstatements, and then to decide the audit scope, procedure and eﬀort accordingly, auditing ﬁrms of diﬀerent
size have diﬀering levels of ability to implement that mode and evaluate corporate governance risk. First, large
audit ﬁrms have more extensive experience and more talented staﬀ, and can thus more quickly grasp and apply
the risk-based audit mode and assess corporate governance risk, and their allocation of audit eﬀort is thus
more competitive than that of smaller audit ﬁrms. Second, unlike smaller ﬁrms, the international Big Four
and the larger domestic auditing ﬁrms were actively involved in drafting the new auditing standards (Pan,
2008). Hence, the Big Ten – the 10 largest audit ﬁrms in the American Institute of CPAs’ (AICPA’s) top
100 ﬁrms – were exposed to the risk-based audit mode and the theory behind it earlier than their smaller coun-
terparts, and they may thus have greater mastery of the new system and be more sensitive to corporate gov-
ernance risk and better able to adjust their audit eﬀort accordingly. Based on the above analysis, we propose
the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2. Since China’s change to the risk-based audit mode, the Big Ten have demonstrated a
signiﬁcantly better grasp of governance risk and audit eﬀort than smaller ﬁrms.4. Study design
4.1. Sample data
The implementation of the new practice guidelines marked the standardization of the risk-based audit
mode in China. Taking 2007 as the starting point of institutional change, we select a sample of the listed com-
panies from 2004 to 2011. Audit eﬀort data come from the China Association of Certiﬁed Public Accountants,
and include auditor tenure, auditor conversion from manual risk-based collation and other data from the
GTA database. The sample is ﬁltered by the following criteria: (1) excluding ﬁnancial companies; (2) excluding
ST and PT companies; (3) excluding observations with missing ﬁnancial and corporate governance informa-
tion; and (4) winsorizing the main continuous variables at the 1% level to eliminate the eﬀect of outlying val-
ues. The sample selection process is illustrated in Table 1.
Table 1
Sample selection.
Sample selection Total sample Before audit mode change After audit mode change
Initial sample 11,844 3332 8512
Financial sector (–) 317 52 265
ST and PT companies (–) 1044 294 750
Missing ﬁnancial data (–) 1997 744 1253
Final sample 8486 2242 6244
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According to the above theoretical analysis, and with reference to Bedard and Johnstone (2004), we con-
struct the following regression model to test our hypotheses.1 Th
includeEffort ¼ b0 þ b1Govþ b2Afterþ b3GovAfterþ b4Big10þ b5Tenureþ b6Switchþ b7Size
þ b8Debtþ b9Lossþ b10Growthþ b11Cro listþ b12Rec invþ b13Liquidityþ b14RPT
þ b15Opinion 1þ b16Punish 1þ b17Feeþ b18Marketindexþ b19Yearþ b20Industryþ l ð1ÞIn Model (1), the interaction term between corporate governance and a change in audit mode, Gov*After,
is expected to have a negative coeﬃcient.
To test Hypothesis 2, we construct Model (2) based on Model (1). In this model, the interaction term,
Gov*Big101, examines whether the Big Ten are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from smaller ﬁrms in their grasp of cor-
porate governance risk and application of audit eﬀort following the change in audit mode. We expect the coef-
ﬁcient of Gov*Big10 to be negative.Effort ¼ b0 þ b1Govþ b2Big10þ b3GovBig10 þ b4Tenureþ b5Switchþ b6Sizeþ b7Debt
þ b8Lossþ b9Growthþ b10Cro listþ b11Rec invþ b12Liquidityþ b13RPT
þ b14Opinion 1þ b15Punish 1þ b16Feeþ b17Marketindexþ b18Yearþ b19Industryþ l ð2ÞThe main model variables and control variables are deﬁned as follows.
4.2.1. Audit eﬀort
The literature deﬁnes audit eﬀort as the number of days spent by the audit team (e.g., Caramanis and
Lennox, 2008; Palmrose, 1984; Davidson and Gist, 1996). Audit days refer to the number of days taken to
complete the entire audit process, including audit planning, ﬁeldwork and review. The research data in most
overseas work in this area are obtained through questionnaires covering the entire audit process. Audit eﬀort
in this study is deﬁned as the log of the product of the number of audit ﬁeldwork days and audit team size. We
use ﬁeldwork days rather than the time taken to complete the entire audit process because ﬁeldwork is a core
part of an independent audit, a key component of audit eﬀort and a key step in constraining management, and
is thus a representative of overall audit eﬀort.
4.2.2. Corporate governance
Corporate governance is an important mechanism for alleviating the agency problem, its core purpose
being to encourage internal employees to act in accordance with the interests of shareholders, and constrain
them from doing otherwise. Governance research covers the early stages of corporate governance through
analysis of speciﬁc corporate governance mechanisms, including ownership structures, boards of directors,
management incentives and other features. In this study, we construct a corporate governance index as a mea-
sure of the overall quality of corporate governance (Gompers et al., 2003; Bai et al., 2005; Li and Zhang, 2005;
Liao et al., 2008; Zhang and Liao, 2010). We follow Bai et al. (2005) and Zhang and Liao (2010) in usinge test sample for Hypothesis 2 includes only data from the period after the audit mode change, and thus cross-multiplication is not
d for the variable After.
Table 2
Corporate governance index.
Governance indicator Variable Explanation
Shareholding structure and
shareholder equity
Largest shareholder
ownership
Percentage ownership of the largest shareholder
Shareholder concentration Total shareholding of the second largest to the tenth largest
shareholder divided by the shareholding of the largest shareholder
Proportion of state-owned
shares
State-owned shares divided by total shares
Proportion of board
shareholding
Proportion of shares held by the board
Proportion of supervisory
committee shareholding
Proportion of shares held by the supervisory committee
Management governance Managerial ownership Proportion of shares held by the management
CEO duality Chairman and CEO in part-time roles
Directors, supervisors, and
other forms of governance
Board size Number of board directors
Proportion of independent
directors
Number of independent directors divided by the number of board
directors
Board meeting frequency Number of meetings of the board of directors
Supervisory board meeting
frequency
Number of supervisory board meetings
Number of committees Number of committees established, such as audit committee and
remuneration committee
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ernance index (Gov), combining a few of the top principal components from PCA. The construction of our
corporate governance index is shown in Table 2, and the factor loading table and discussion of PCA are pro-
vided in the Appendix.4.2.3. Big Ten
Big Ten (Big10) refer to the 10 largest audit ﬁrms in the AICPA’s top 100 ﬁrms. DeAngelo (1981) considers
large audit ﬁrms that obtain long-term quasi-rents to be more independent than smaller ﬁrms, and they should
thus be more active in exerting adequate audit eﬀort to reduce earnings management and control audit risk
(Caramanis and Lennox, 2008). In China, however, much research has conﬁrmed that the audit quality of nei-
ther the large domestic audit ﬁrms nor the international Big Four is high. Given the country’s lack of demand
for high-quality auditing, large audit ﬁrms have little motivation to invest in the eﬀort needed to provide such
auditing, and the expected sign on Big10 is thus uncertain.4.2.4. Control variables
With reference to Bedard and Johnstone (2004) and other studies, and in consideration of China’s special
institutional background, we select the following control variables to control for other factors that may aﬀect
audit eﬀort.
When auditor tenure (Tenure) is longer, auditors are more familiar with the client’s corporate governance
and ﬁnancial situation, and the degree of information asymmetry is lower than with new clients, which should
help to conserve audit eﬀort. Nevertheless, despite the theoretical expectations of this study, Caramanis and
Lennox (2008) ﬁnd auditor tenure to be positively correlated with audit eﬀort. Hence, we do not predict the
sign between Tenure and audit eﬀort.
A change in auditor (Switch) increases the information asymmetry between auditors and clients. The suc-
cessive auditor needs more time to understand and become familiar with the client and to carefully assess the
risk of a material misstatement to correlate it with audit eﬀort. However, according to DeAngelo’s (1981) the-
ory of quasi-rents, auditors usually attract clients with low prices initially. In China, an auditor’s ability to
obtain future quasi-rents is uncertain, as the audit division is likely to reduce the necessary audit eﬀort after
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uncertain.
The larger the company (Size), the more audit eﬀort needed (O’Keefe et al., 1994; Palmrose, 1989). A pos-
itive association is thus expected between company size and audit eﬀort.
The asset-liability ratio (Debt) reﬂects the ability of companies to repay their loans. The higher the ratio,
the greater both the debt risk and audit risk (O’Keefe et al., 1994). A positive association between Debt and
audit eﬀort is thus expected.
O’Keefe et al. (1994) claim that when an audited client is operating at a loss, auditors need to pay special
attention to the business risk and be aware of the potential for business failure or shareholder litigation arising
from the discontinuation of operations. In addition, the management of such a company may have a strong
incentive to engage in a “whitewash,” meaning that auditors would be wise to increase their audit eﬀort to
control audit risk. We thus expect operating loss (Loss) to be positively associated with audit eﬀort.
As company growth (Growth) is directly related to a company’s future proﬁtability and ability to expand
production, we expect it to be negatively correlated with audit eﬀort (O’Keefe et al., 1994).
When domestic listed companies are also listed overseas (Cro_list), the various ﬁnancial reporting require-
ments in the overseas jurisdictions can aﬀect the quality of their data (Ball et al., 2000), a possibility that needs
to be taken into account with regard to investment in audit eﬀort if a cross-listed company’s ﬁnancial report-
ing and audit reports are intended for both domestic and overseas use. Hence, we expect a positive association
between Cro_list and audit eﬀort.
The inventory-accounts receivable ratio (Rec_inv) is used to measure the complexity of a client’s business,
with greater complexity requiring more audit eﬀort. We thus expect it to have a positive association with audit
eﬀort.
The current ratio (Liquidity) reﬂects a company’s ability to use corporate cash to repay short-term borrow-
ings. The higher the current ratio, the lower both the debt and audit risk. Hence, we expect Liquidity to have a
negative relationship with audit eﬀort.
Related party loans (RPT) represent the proportion of company debt comprising direct or indirect debt.
Loans from related parties reduce transaction costs, optimize capital structure and improve capital utilization.
However, they are also associated with the way in which related parties or major shareholders take up com-
pany funds. As the circumstances diﬀer for diﬀerent companies, the expected sign is uncertain.
Prior year audit opinion (Opinion_1) represents a non-standard audit opinion, indicating that the previous
annual ﬁnancial statements contained a material misstatement or did not reﬂect fair value in some signiﬁcant
respect. To reduce audit risk, auditors need to invest greater audit eﬀort. Hence, we expect that eﬀort to have a
positive association with Opinion_1.
If a client was punished (Punish_1) by the regulatory authorities for the quality of its ﬁnancial information
in the previous year, we predict that both audit risk and regulatory risk are high, and auditors need to be more
prudent. Thus, we expect a positive association between audit eﬀort and Punish_1.
Palmrose (1989) considers the audit contract fee (Fee) to have two models: ﬁxed cost and cost plus. Fixed
costs are often ascertained before the initial audit, and remain unchanged over a given period (often several
years), whereas the cost-plus model is generally based on audit eﬀort, and is usually determined at the end of
the audit. We speculate that a ﬁxed-cost contract is likely to be an important variable in investment in audit
eﬀort, whereas a cost-plus contract is unlikely to exert any inﬂuence. Because of the two types of fee contracts,
“low-balling” has some eﬀect on audit eﬀort. DeAngelo (1981) claims that low-balling does not harm auditor
independence because auditor switching has transaction costs, and auditors can thus recover their initial pric-
ing discount through future audits. However, in 1998, the China Securities Regulatory Commission stated that
low-balling and the payment of kickbacks or commissions greatly reduce an audit ﬁrm’s proﬁt margin, leading
some ﬁrms to reduce their audit eﬀort considerably (China Securities Regulatory Commission, 1998). In sum-
mary, the expected sign of the relationship between audit fee and audit eﬀort is uncertain.
Market process (Marketindex) refers to the level of economic development in a region or area. The more
economically developed the region/area, the better the legal environment it enjoys and the greater the regula-
tory and litigation risks for auditors. A positive association between Marketindex and audit eﬀort is thus
expected.
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5. Empirical testing
5.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics for all of the variables. The average audit eﬀort is 5.6, indicating
that auditors devote some eﬀort to searching for material misstatements to fulﬁll their contractual obligations.
The maximum corporate governance index value is 10.77, the minimum is 1.52 and the mean is 0.06, with
the standard deviation of 0.6 indicating signiﬁcant diﬀerences across companies.
Table 5 reports the mean and median diﬀerences in the main and control variables before and after the
audit mode change. The majority of the variables exhibit signiﬁcant diﬀerences after the change. For example,
the mean and median for corporate governance (Gov) shift from negative to positive, signiﬁcant at the 1%
level, indicating improvement in the extent of sound and eﬀective corporate governance in the post-change
period. In addition, the results in Table 5 also indicate the need to control for these factors in relation to audit
eﬀort.
5.2. Empirical results and analysis
Table 6 reports the testing of Hypothesis 1. The coeﬃcient for the main eﬀect of Gov is 0.109, and the coef-
ﬁcient for the interaction term, Gov*After, is 0.277 (T value = 4.98), signiﬁcant at the 1% level, suggesting
that better corporate governance did not save audit eﬀort before the mode change, but reduced it signiﬁcantly
after it. Keeping other factors constant, a one unit increase in the corporate governance index is associated
with a reduction in the number of ﬁeld days by 18.3%. Regarding economic signiﬁcance, marginal eﬀect anal-
ysis shows that after the audit mode change (i.e., After = 1), a corporate governance index increase from the
25th to the 50th percentile (0.43 to 0.13) is equal to a reduction of 26 days (equivalent to a 10.4% median
change) in audit eﬀort. Thus, these ﬁndings are both statistically and economically signiﬁcant. Overall, when
auditor decision-making considers internal controls alone to be relevant to ﬁnancial statements, investment in
audit eﬀort does not reﬂect corporate governance risk, whereas risk-based auditing encourages auditors to
consider corporate governance factors more fully. The regression results in Table 6 support Hypothesis 1,
and show that the objectives of the risk-based audit mode have been fulﬁlled to a certain extent.
Table 7 reports the test results for Hypothesis 2. The coeﬃcients for Gov*Big10 are signiﬁcant at the 1%
level (T = 4.93), supporting the hypothesis that the Big Ten are better able than their smaller counterparts to
recognize improved corporate governance and adjust their audit eﬀort accordingly. This result also indicates
that the risk-based audit mode improves practice and risk control to some extent. It also implies that smaller
ﬁrms need to strengthen their grasp of risk-based auditing and that the Chinese Institute of CPAs needs to
improve its supervision and inspection regime and apply more eﬀective controls to ensure that small ﬁrms
implement the risk-based mode.
To seek further evidence for Hypothesis 2, we also test the sample in the period before implementation of
the new auditing standards. As shown in Table 8, a positive but not signiﬁcant relationship is found between
corporate governance and audit eﬀort, but the regression results are inconsistent with those after the audit
mode change. The coeﬃcient of Gov*Big10 is positive but not signiﬁcant, and does not match the assumption,
providing further evidence for Hypothesis 2.
5.3. Robustness tests
5.3.1. Addition and deletion of transition sample
The foregoing tests used 2007 as the start of the research window, but it is possible that auditors may
already have been aﬀected by the new auditing standards in 2006. We thus also test ﬁscal year 2006 as the date
of the change in auditing practice, but our conclusions remain unchanged. The results also remain unchanged
when we remove 2006 from the sample. (The results of these tests are not reported due to space limitations.)
Table 3
Variable deﬁnitions.
Variable type Variable Variable description
Dependent Eﬀort Log of the product of audit ﬁeldwork days and audit team size
Independent Gov Calculated using principal component analysis
Gov_1 Log of Gov
After Dummy, assigned 1 when ﬁscal year is 2007 or later; otherwise 0
Big10 Dummy, assigned 1 when audit ﬁrm was assessed as being in the top 10 by the AICPA; otherwise 0
Control Tenure Number of years of continuous auditing
Switch Dummy, assigned 1 when auditor has changed; otherwise 0
Size Natural log of total assets at year end
Debt Total liabilities/total assets
Loss Dummy, assigned 1 when business proﬁt is negative; otherwise 0
Growth Growth rate of main business revenue (rate of change)
Cro_list Dummy, assigned 1 when company is cross-listed; otherwise 0
Rec_inv (Accounts receivable + inventory)/total assets at start of year
Liquidity Current assets/current liabilities
RPT Proportion of liabilities accounted for by related party loans
Opinion_1 Dummy, assigned 1 when audit opinion is unqualiﬁed; otherwise 0
Punish_1 Dummy, assigned 1 when subject to regulatory penaltya; otherwise 0
Fee Log of audit fee
Marketindex Refer to Annual Report of China Market Index: Relative Process in 2011 (Fan and Wang, 2011), the
marketization index
Lawindex Refer to Annual Report of China Market Index: Relative Process in 2011 (Fan and Wang, 2011), the legal
environment index
Year Year dummy variables
Industry Industry dummy variables
a The decision-making body includes the Punishment Commission, Ministry of Finance and stock exchange. Punishment results when a listed company’s ﬁnancial reports or ﬁnancial
information violate China’s securities law, stock listing rules, enterprise accounting standards, various requirements regarding external guarantees and funds between related parties or
other relevant laws and regulations.
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Table 4
Descriptive statistics.
Variable Sample Mean Stdev Min Max
Eﬀort 8486 5.6 1.2 0.69 11.68
Gov 8486 0.06 0.6 1.52 10.77
Big10 8486 0.32 0.47 0 1
Tenure 8486 5.06 3.02 1 17
Switch 8486 0.09 0.29 0 1
Size 8486 21.63 1.2 17.12 28.28
Debt 8486 0.49 0.2 0.05 0.95
Loss 8486 0.14 0.35 0 1
Growth 8486 0.03 0.08 1.68 0.46
Cro_list 8486 0.09 0.29 0 1
Rec_inv 8486 0.28 0.18 0 0.94
Liquidity 8486 1.8 1.99 0.24 15.49
RPT 8486 0.21 5.07 0 200
Opinion_1 8486 0.03 0.17 0 1
Punish_1 8486 0.04 0.21 0 1
Fee 8486 13.22 0.68 10.31 17.81
Marketindex 8486 8.56 2.04 0.29 11.8
Lawindex 8486 10.2 5.27 0.18 19.89
Table 5
Univariate tests.
Variable Before audit mode change After audit mode change Diﬀerence in T/Z value
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Eﬀort 5.62 5.52 5.61 5.53 0.618 0.434
Gov 0.37 0.39 0.04 0.04 29.421*** 31.10***
Big10 0.23 0 0.35 0 10.26*** 10.20***
Tenure 4.39 4 5.29 5 12.25*** 8.75***
Switch 0.09 0 0.1 0 1.73* 1.73*
Size 21.41 21.31 21.7 21.54 9.94*** 8.96***
Debt 0.5 0.51 0.49 0.5 3.22*** 2.75***
Loss 0.15 0 0.14 0 1.96** 1.96**
Growth 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 4.74*** 1.16
Cro_list 0.1 0 0.09 0 1.50 1.50
Rec_inv 0.3 0.28 0.27 0.25 5.39*** 6.35***
Liquidity 1.55 1.18 1.89 1.29 6.86*** 7.44***
RPT 0 0 0.29 0 2.32** 2.54**
Opinion_1 0.04 0 0.03 0 3.39*** 3.39***
Punish_1 0.04 0 0.05 0 1.14 1.14
Fee 13.08 13.02 13.27 13.12 11.57*** 11.80***
Marketindex 7.59 7.87 8.9 9.02 27.27*** 27.43***
Lawindex 7.31 6.2 11.23 8.46 31.93*** 31.30***
Note: T/Z value diﬀerences are based on T-tests and nonparametric Wilcoxon tests.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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During the period in which the audit mode changed, the legal environment also changed, which may have
aﬀected the relationship between audit eﬀort and corporate governance. Hence, we re-examine the legal envi-
ronment after the change (because the market process and legal environment are highly correlated, we no
longer control for the marketization index when we control for the legal environment). The regression results,
shown in Table 9, leave our conclusions unchanged, further supporting our hypotheses.
Table 6
Audit mode change, corporate governance and audit eﬀort.
Variable Expected sign Eﬀort Eﬀort Eﬀort
Gov  0.126*** 0.124*** 0.109**
(6.03) (5.84) (2.12)
After ? 0.036 0.068
(0.72) (1.34)
Gov*After  0.277***
(4.98)
Big10 ? 0.085*** 0.086*** 0.086***
(3.32) (3.36) (3.37)
Tenure ? 0.002 0.002 0.003
(0.63) (0.47) (0.79)
Switch ? 0.070* 0.073* 0.067
(1.67) (1.73) (1.61)
Size + 0.206*** 0.207*** 0.209***
(13.77) (13.79) (13.99)
Debt + 0.010 0.010 0.023
(0.13) (0.13) (0.29)
Loss + 0.033 0.033 0.031
(0.92) (0.92) (0.85)
Growth  0.212 0.205 0.182
(1.40) (1.34) (1.19)
Cro_list + 0.174*** 0.172*** 0.166***
(4.17) (4.12) (3.97)
Rec_inv + 0.081 0.079 0.075
(1.14) (1.11) (1.05)
Liquidity  0.022*** 0.022*** 0.020***
(3.22) (3.15) (2.83)
RPT ? 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.52) (0.53) (0.48)
Opinion_1 + 0.015 0.017 0.021
(0.24) (0.27) (0.34)
Punish_1 + 0.052 0.053 0.060
(0.99) (0.99) (1.14)
Fee ? 0.578*** 0.578*** 0.579***
(23.07) (23.08) (23.12)
Marketindex + 0.015** 0.015*** 0.016***
(2.56) (2.64) (2.83)
Year Controlled Controlled Controlled
Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled
Constant 6.530*** 6.539*** 6.568***
(23.87) (23.88) (24.02)
N 8486 8486 8486
Adj-R2 0.31 0.31 0.31
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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Table 7
Audit ﬁrm size, corporate governance and audit eﬀort after audit mode change.
Variable Expected sign After audit mode change
Eﬀort Eﬀort Eﬀort
Gov  0.162*** 0.164*** 0.094***
(6.92) (7.02) (3.47)
Big10 ? 0.068** 0.088***
(2.37) (3.03)
Gov*Big10 ? 0.219***
(4.93)
Tenure ? 0.008* 0.007 0.007
(1.80) (1.57) (1.58)
Switch ? 0.081* 0.078 0.078
(1.69) (1.62) (1.63)
Size + 0.211*** 0.211*** 0.211***
(12.27) (12.27) (12.31)
Debt + 0.005 0.0104 0.001
(0.06) (0.11) (0.02)
Loss + 0.008 0.010 0.012
(0.20) (0.24) (0.29)
Growth  0.260 0.260 0.239
(1.52) (1.52) (1.40)
Cro_list + 0.205*** 0.196*** 0.181***
(4.11) (3.93) (3.61)
Rec_inv + 0.068 0.068 0.076
(0.83) (0.84) (0.93)
Liquidity  0.020*** 0.020** 0.019**
(2.61) (2.53) (2.53)
RPT ? 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.51) (0.50) (0.45)
Opinion_1 + 0.047 0.050 0.051
(0.60) (0.64) (0.66)
Punish_1 + 0.013 0.014 0.008
(0.23) (0.24) (0.15)
Fee ? 0.587*** 0.574*** 0.565***
(20.46) (19.59) (19.30)
Marketindex + 0.009 0.008 0.008
(1.50) (1.25) (1.35)
Year Controlled Controlled Controlled
Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled
Constant 6.662*** 6.503*** 6.400***
(21.63) (20.64) (-20.30)
N 6244 6244 6244
Adj-R2 0.34 0.34 0.341
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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Table 8
Audit ﬁrm size, corporate governance and audit eﬀort before audit mode change.
Variable Expected sign Before audit mode change
Eﬀort Eﬀort Eﬀort
Gov  0.036 0.032 0.009
(1.05) (0.94) (0.26)
Big10 ? 0.085** 0.131***
(2.35) (2.78)
Gov*Big10 ? 0.124
(1.52)
Tenure ? 0.011 0.013* 0.012*
(1.44) (1.73) (1.65)
Switch ? 0.019 0.022 0.025
(0.34) (0.40) (0.45)
Size + 0.071*** 0.069*** 0.070***
(3.45) (3.31) (3.38)
Debt + 0.223** 0.205* 0.205*
(2.07) (1.91) (1.91)
Loss + 0.026 0.026 0.027
(0.55) (0.55) (0.57)
Growth  0.026 0.026 0.016
(0.11) (0.11) (0.07)
Cro_list + 0.080 0.104** 0.101**
(1.61) (2.04) (1.99)
Rec_inv + 0.063 0.064 0.063
(0.66) (0.67) (0.66)
Liquidity  0.010 0.010 0.010
(0.99) (1.00) (0.98)
RPT ? 0.046 0.051 0.054
(0.42) (0.46) (0.49)
Opinion_1 + 0.048 0.050 0.051
(0.65) (0.68) (0.70)
Punish_1 + 0.063 0.070 0.071
(0.87) (0.97) (0.99)
Fee ? 0.179*** 0.164*** 0.165***
(5.59) (5.02) (5.05)
Marketindex + 0.035*** 0.033*** 0.033***
(4.08) (3.88) (3.79)
Year Controlled Controlled Controlled
Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled
Constant 4.151*** 3.917*** 3.967***
(10.57) (9.68) (9.77)
N 2242 2242 2242
Adj-R2 0.07 0.07 0.08
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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Table 9
Robustness test: controlling for legal environment.
Variable Expected sign Eﬀort Eﬀort Eﬀort
Panel A: Eﬀect of audit mode change on relationship between corporate governance and audit eﬀort
Gov  0.128*** 0.124*** 0.105**
(6.14) (5.86) (2.05)
After ? 0.066 0.097*
(1.30) (1.88)
Gov*After  0.272***
(4.91)
Control variables Controlled Controlled Controlled
Year Controlled Controlled Controlled
Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled
Constant 6.443*** 6.452*** 6.477***
(23.61) (23.64) (23.76)
N 8486 8486 8486
Adj-R2 0.31 0.31 0.34
Variable Expected sign After audit mode change
Eﬀort Eﬀort Eﬀort
Panel B: Audit ﬁrm size, corporate governance and audit eﬀort
Gov  0.163*** 0.165*** 0.094***
(6.98) (7.06) (3.47)
Big10 ? 0.059** 0.079***
(2.03) (2.69)
Gov*Big10 ? 0.221***
(4.97)
Control variables Controlled Controlled Controlled
Industry/Year Controlled Controlled Controlled
Constant 6.603*** 6.473*** 6.366***
(21.51) (20.65) (20.30)
N 6244 6244 6244
Adj-R2 0.34 0.34 0.34
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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Because a client’s choice of auditor is a business decision that is seldom random, there may be a
self-selection problem. For example, a client may choose a large audit ﬁrm, which is more likely to provide
a high-quality audit, to signal excellence to the market (Francis, 1984; Francis and Simon, 1987). We thus
speculate that companies that diﬀer in corporate governance quality may also diﬀer in their choice of auditor
and that auditors may accept clients in accordance with their level of corporate governance, thus creating a
self-selection problem that may bias least squares estimation. To control for this possibility, we use
Heckman’s (1978) two-stage selection, as follows.
First, we estimate the probability model of an audit ﬁrm being chosen to calculate the inverse Mills coef-
ﬁcient (i.e., Mills). The ﬁrst step in Model (3) is shown below, with the dependent variable being the proba-
bility of a listed company selecting a Big Ten audit ﬁrm.PrðBig10Þ ¼ c0 þ c1Sizeþ c2Capitalþ c3Cycle þ c4Roaþ c5Growth
þ c6Lossþ c7Govþ c8Yearþ c9Industry þ e ð3Þ
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tional variables. Francis and Krishnan (1999) argue that companies with a high level of accruals are more
likely to employ large audit ﬁrms, with capital intensity and the business cycle being the key variables aﬀecting
the level of accruals. Capital intensity (total ﬁxed assets divided by net sales) mainly measures long-term accru-
als, with greater capital intensity indicating fewer accruals. The longer the operating cycle (inventory turnover
days + accounts receivable turnover days) and the more inventory and accounts receivable, the higher the
level of accruals. To these two variables, we add company size, growth, proﬁtability and ﬁnancial distress.
As the new auditing standards require auditors to evaluate a client’s corporate governance, we also include
the corporate governance index (Gov) in this model (variable deﬁnitions not reported due to space
constraints).
Second, we incorporate the estimated inverse Mills coeﬃcient (i.e., Mills) into Model (2), and then regress
according to the previous method.
The results of the self-selection regression model show that the greater a company’s size, sales cycle, prof-
itability and corporate governance index, and the lower its capital intensity, the greater the probability of it
hiring one of the Big Ten. The coeﬃcients for each variable are consistent with expectations. The regression
results are essentially consistent with Table 7, and as they are based on the estimated Mills coeﬃcient used in
Model (3) and entered into the Model (2) regression, they support our earlier conclusion (results unreported
due to space constraints).
5.3.4. Endogenous decision-making problems between audit eﬀort and corporate governance
Jensen and Meckling (1976) consider external auditing to be an important guarantee mechanism for reduc-
ing both conﬂicts of interest between a company’s contractual parties and agency costs. The visibility of exter-
nal auditors aﬀects a company’s corporate governance, and there may thus be an endogeneity problem
between decisions made by external auditors (including their allocation of audit eﬀort) and corporate gover-
nance risk, which could in turn aﬀect the reliability of the estimated coeﬃcients in the regression model.
Caramanis and Lennox (2008) encounter a similar problem in the relationship between audit eﬀort and earn-
ings quality, and use lagged estimated audit eﬀort as the instrumental variable to solve the corresponding
endogeneity problem.
Drawing on Caramanis and Lennox (2008), to represent corporate governance we select an instrumental
variable that does not directly aﬀect audit eﬀort. The lag variable of corporate governance is deemed appro-
priate for this purpose, as it meets the demands of both the Sargan and Hausman tests as an instrument.
Furthermore, although the internal and external governance environment is constantly changing in theory,
it is not reasonable to expect auditors to consider the lag in corporate governance when making decisions.
Hence, although lagged corporate governance variables can explain the current period of corporate gover-
nance, they are unlikely to aﬀect current audit eﬀort directly. Empirical tests conﬁrm that the lag in corporate
governance can explain current corporate governance but has no direct correlation with current audit eﬀort
(results unreported owing to space constraints). We thus use the estimated lag in corporate governance as
an instrumental variable in the corresponding regression analysis. As shown in Table 10, the results still sup-
port the original conclusion.
5.3.5. Structural change test
Because all listed companies in China have been aﬀected by the new auditing standards, no control sample
is possible, rendering it diﬃcult to exclude other factors over the study period. We thus conduct sub-period
analysis to examine the relationship between corporate governance and audit eﬀort before and after 2007.
Using the Chow test with dummy variables, we assess whether there has been structural change. The results
in Table 11 show that in the period before 2007 there is a positive correlation between audit eﬀort and cor-
porate governance, which is inconsistent with our theoretical expectation. In the period after that year, how-
ever, there is a negative correlation between the two, and a coeﬃcient diﬀerence test shows the diﬀerence to be
signiﬁcant (T value = 4.97). Hence, the relationship between audit eﬀort and governance before and after
2007 is the result of structural change.
Table 10
Robustness test: controlling for endogenous decision-making problem.
Variable Expected sign Eﬀort Eﬀort Eﬀort
Panel A: Eﬀect of audit mode change and corporate governance on audit eﬀort
Gov_1  0.095*** 0.095*** 0.151**
(3.20) (3.20) (2.03)
After ? 0.191*** 0.292***
(3.59) (4.87)
Gov_1*After  0.291***
(3.95)
Control variables Controlled Controlled Controlled
Year Controlled Controlled Controlled
Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled
Constant 6.448*** 6.256*** 6.198***
(19.85) (19.74) (19.55)
N 6360 6360 6360
Adj-R2 0.31 0.31 0.31
Variable Expected sign After audit mode change
Eﬀort Eﬀort Eﬀort
Panel B: Audit ﬁrm size, corporate governance and audit eﬀort
Gov_1  0.133*** 0.135*** 0.002
(4.05) (4.11) (0.06)
Big10 ? 0.068** 0.075**
(2.13) (2.36)
Gov_1*Big10 ? 0.359***
(6.46)
Control variables Controlled Controlled Controlled
Industry and year Controlled Controlled Controlled
Constant 6.531*** 6.374*** 6.269***
(18.78) (17.93) (17.69)
N 5080 5080 5080
Adj-R2 0.31 0.31 0.33
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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5.4. Supplementary analysis
If, following the adoption of the risk-based audit mode, auditors exerted greater eﬀort in the face of poor
corporate governance, and thus improved audit quality and corporate governance while simultaneously reduc-
ing audit eﬀort without any decline in audit quality, that would constitute further proof of the optimization of
audit eﬀort in the post-change period.
We thus conduct supplementary analysis using earnings quality as a proxy for audit quality, and ﬁnd that
for companies with poor corporate governance, increased audit eﬀort reduces earnings management and
improves audit quality. We also ﬁnd no evidence of a decline in audit quality when audit eﬀort is reduced
due to better corporate governance. These ﬁndings suggest that the implementation of the risk-based audit
mode has indeed optimized audit eﬀort in China (results unreported due to space constraints).
Table 11
Results of chow test for dummy type.
Variable Expected sign Eﬀort Eﬀort
(1) Before audit mode change (2) After audit mode change
Gov  0.110** 0.168***
(2.09) (7.17)
Control variables Controlled Controlled
Year Controlled Controlled
Industry Controlled Controlled
Constant 6.756*** 6.422***
(10.99) (20.26)
Diﬀ of (1) & (2) 0.287***
(4.97)
N 2242 6244
Adj-R2 0.25 0.33
* Statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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Given that contract management creates an incentive to manipulate ﬁnancial information, auditors who
adopt the internal control-based mode ﬁnd it diﬃcult to identify ﬁnancial manipulation by management,
which aﬀects both the eﬃciency and results of their audits. The risk-based system, in contrast, requires audi-
tors to perform a deeper assessment of clients’ corporate governance, as reasonable and eﬀective corporate
governance directly constrains management from falsifying ﬁnancial statements.
Based on a literature review and an analysis of China’s institutional background, this study examines
whether auditors have been evaluating corporate governance to guide their allocation of audit eﬀort since
the government-mandated change to the risk-based audit mode. It also explores the optimal allocation of
audit eﬀort needed to improve audit eﬀectiveness and the way in which corporate governance has inﬂuenced
the allocation of audit eﬀort since the change in audit mode. Our ﬁndings show that under the earlier internal
control-based mode, the relationship between audit eﬀort and corporate governance was weak, but became
signiﬁcantly stronger following the implementation of the risk-based mode. Further analysis shows that since
the change in audit mode, Big Ten auditors have gained a signiﬁcantly better grasp of governance risk and
allocated their audit eﬀorts accordingly.
The results indicate that the mandatory switch to the risk-based audit mode has improved the ability of
auditors in China to practice risk control and audit eﬃciency. However, the Chinese Institute of CPAs needs
to strengthen its supervision and inspection, particularly for smaller auditing ﬁrms, to ensure a better under-
standing and more skilled use of the risk-based mode. Our study oﬀers a useful perspective on the issues con-
cerned and provides empirical evidence for the development of policy relating to investor protection and
market regulation.
It should be noted that there are some inherent limitations in our sample. Most importantly, because the
regulations require all listed companies and auditors to apply the risk-based audit mode, it is not possible to
ﬁnd a control sample of companies unaﬀected by the new auditing standards for use in our regression models.
Appendix A
Based on PCA, we use software to normalize the 12 indicators and select 5 main components. The corpo-
rate governance index is based on the weightings of principal components Y1 to Y5
(Gov = W1 * Y1 + W2 * Y2 + W3 * Y3 + W4 * Y4 + W5 * Y5, where W is the calculated variance contribu-
tion rate). The factor loadings of the principal components are shown in Table 12. In PCA, a factor with a
Table 12
Principal component factor loadings.
Name Principal component
Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5
Shareholding structure and shareholder equity Largest shareholder ownership 0.16 0.27 0.33 0.52 0.48
Shareholder concentration 0.50 0.18 0.40 0.14 0.29
Proportion of state-owned shares 0.39 0.46 0.21 0.56 0.22
Proportion of board shareholding 0.85 0.38 0.07 0.18 0.04
Proportion of supervisory committee
shareholding
0.14 0.66 0.17 0.40 0.25
Management governance Managerial ownership 0.85 0.39 0.07 -0.17 0.04
CEO duality 0.36 0.16 0.21 -0.00 0.04
Directors, supervisors and other forms of
governance
Board size 0.25 0.09 0.66 0.14 0.29
Proportion of independent directors 0.27 0.18 0.61 0.28 0.18
Board meeting frequency 0.20 0.52 0.01 0.11 0.61
Supervisory board meeting frequency 0.40 0.51 0.08 0.19 0.43
Number of committee members 0.34 0.44 0.17 0.10 0.04
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principal component, the loading factors of shareholder concentration, proportion of board shareholding
and management ownership account for more than 50% of the variance, and are thus used to represent
and reﬂect shareholding structure, shareholder equity and managerial ownership. The second principal com-
ponent is a less important factor in the composition, and the loading factors of the meeting frequency of the
board of directors and supervisory board are slightly more signiﬁcant than the other indicators, and better
reﬂect directors, supervisors and other forms of governance. For the third main component, the highest load-
ing factors are board size followed by shareholder concentration, and these two indicators thus reﬂect share-
holding structure and shareholder equity, and directors, supervisors and other forms of governance. For the
fourth principal component, the largest loading factors are the largest shareholder and state-owned shares,
which account for more than 50%, and thus better reﬂect shareholding structure and shareholder equity.
For the ﬁfth main component, the loading factors of board and supervisory board meeting frequency are
the most signiﬁcant indicators to reﬂect directors, supervisors and other forms of governance. Thus, the keys
to improving corporate governance are to increase the shareholdings of the largest shareholders, to reduce the
proportion of state-owned shares, and to increase managerial ownership and the meeting frequency of both
the board of directors and supervisory board.
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